Self-evaluation of decision-making: A general Bayesian framework for metacognitive computation.

People are often aware of their mistakes, and report levels of confidence in their choices that correlate with objective performance. These metacognitive assessments of decision quality are important for the guidance of behavior, particularly when external feedback is absent or sporadic. However, a computational framework that accounts for both confidence and error detection is lacking. In addition, accounts of dissociations between performance and metacognition have often relied on ad hoc assumptions, precluding a unified account of intact and impaired self-evaluation. Here we present a general Bayesian framework in which self-evaluation is cast as a "second-order" inference on a coupled but distinct decision system, computationally equivalent to inferring the performance of another actor. Second-order computation may ensue whenever there is a separation between internal states supporting decisions and confidence estimates over space and/or time. We contrast second-order computation against simpler first-order models in which the same internal state supports both decisions and confidence estimates. Through simulations we show that second-order computation provides a unified account of different types of self-evaluation often considered in separate literatures, such as confidence and error detection, and generates novel predictions about the contribution of one's own actions to metacognitive judgments. In addition, the model provides insight into why subjects' metacognition may sometimes be better or worse than task performance. We suggest that second-order computation may underpin self-evaluative judgments across a range of domains. (PsycINFO Database Recor

Experience replay is associated with efficient nonlocal learning

To make effective decisions, people need to consider the relationship between actions and outcomes. These are often separated by time and space. The neural mechanisms by which disjoint actions and outcomes are linked remain unknown. One promising hypothesis involves neural replay of nonlocal experience. Using a task that segregates direct from indirect value learning, combined with magnetoencephalography, we examined the role of neural replay in human nonlocal learning. After receipt of a reward, we found significant backward replay of nonlocal experience, with a 160-millisecond state-to-state time lag, which was linked to efficient learning of action values. Backward replay and behavioral evidence of nonlocal learning were more pronounced for experiences of greater benefit for future behavior. These findings support nonlocal replay as a neural mechanism for solving complex credit assignment problems during learning

Retrospective model-based inference guides model-free credit assignment

An extensive reinforcement learning literature shows that organisms assign credit efficiently, even under conditions of state uncertainty. However, little is known about credit-assignment when state uncertainty is subsequently resolved. Here, we address this problem within the framework of an interaction between model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) control systems. We present and support experimentally a theory of MB retrospective-inference. Within this framework, a MB system resolves uncertainty that prevailed when actions were taken thus guiding an MF credit-assignment. Using a task in which there was initial uncertainty about the lotteries that were chosen, we found that when participants’ momentary uncertainty about which lottery had generated an outcome was resolved by provision of subsequent information, participants preferentially assigned credit within a MF system to the lottery they retrospectively inferred was responsible for this outcome. These findings extend our knowledge about the range of MB functions and the scope of system interactions

Reinstated episodic context guides sampling-based decisions for reward.

How does experience inform decisions? In episodic sampling, decisions are guided by a few episodic memories of past choices. This process can yield choice patterns similar to model-free reinforcement learning; however, samples can vary from trial to trial, causing decisions to vary. Here we show that context retrieved during episodic sampling can cause choice behavior to deviate sharply from the predictions of reinforcement learning. Specifically, we show that, when a given memory is sampled, choices (in the present) are influenced by the properties of other decisions made in the same context as the sampled event. This effect is mediated by fMRI measures of context retrieval on each trial, suggesting a mechanism whereby cues trigger retrieval of context, which then triggers retrieval of other decisions from that context. This result establishes a new avenue by which experience can guide choice and, as such, has broad implications for the study of decisions

Prioritized memory access explains planning and hippocampal replay.

To make decisions, animals must evaluate candidate choices by accessing memories of relevant experiences. Yet little is known about which experiences are considered or ignored during deliberation, which ultimately governs choice. We propose a normative theory predicting which memories should be accessed at each moment to optimize future decisions. Using nonlocal 'replay' of spatial locations in hippocampus as a window into memory access, we simulate a spatial navigation task in which an agent accesses memories of locations sequentially, ordered by utility: how much extra reward would be earned due to better choices. This prioritization balances two desiderata: the need to evaluate imminent choices versus the gain from propagating newly encountered information to preceding locations. Our theory offers a simple explanation for numerous findings about place cells; unifies seemingly disparate proposed functions of replay including planning, learning, and consolidation; and posits a mechanism whose dysfunction may underlie pathologies like rumination and craving

Risk, Unexpected Uncertainty, and Estimation Uncertainty: Bayesian Learning in Unstable Settings

Recently, evidence has emerged that humans approach learning using Bayesian updating rather than (model-free) reinforcement algorithms in a six-arm restless bandit problem. Here, we investigate what this implies for human appreciation of uncertainty. In our task, a Bayesian learner distinguishes three equally salient levels of uncertainty. First, the Bayesian perceives irreducible uncertainty or risk: even knowing the payoff probabilities of a given arm, the outcome remains uncertain. Second, there is (parameter) estimation uncertainty or ambiguity: payoff probabilities are unknown and need to be estimated. Third, the outcome probabilities of the arms change: the sudden jumps are referred to as unexpected uncertainty. We document how the three levels of uncertainty evolved during the course of our experiment and how it affected the learning rate. We then zoom in on estimation uncertainty, which has been suggested to be a driving force in exploration, in spite of evidence of widespread aversion to ambiguity. Our data corroborate the latter. We discuss neural evidence that foreshadowed the ability of humans to distinguish between the three levels of uncertainty. Finally, we investigate the boundaries of human capacity to implement Bayesian learning. We repeat the experiment with different instructions, reflecting varying levels of structural uncertainty. Under this fourth notion of uncertainty, choices were no better explained by Bayesian updating than by (model-free) reinforcement learning. Exit questionnaires revealed that participants remained unaware of the presence of unexpected uncertainty and failed to acquire the right model with which to implement Bayesian updating

Disorders of compulsivity: a common bias towards learning habits.

Why do we repeat choices that we know are bad for us? Decision making is characterized by the parallel engagement of two distinct systems, goal-directed and habitual, thought to arise from two computational learning mechanisms, model-based and model-free. The habitual system is a candidate source of pathological fixedness. Using a decision task that measures the contribution to learning of either mechanism, we show a bias towards model-free (habit) acquisition in disorders involving both natural (binge eating) and artificial (methamphetamine) rewards, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. This favoring of model-free learning may underlie the repetitive behaviors that ultimately dominate in these disorders. Further, we show that the habit formation bias is associated with lower gray matter volumes in caudate and medial orbitofrontal cortex. Our findings suggest that the dysfunction in a common neurocomputational mechanism may underlie diverse disorders involving compulsion.This study was funded by the WT fellowship grant for VV (093705/Z/ 10/Z) and Cambridge NIHR Biomedical Research Centre. VV and NAH are Wellcome Trust (WT) intermediate Clinical Fellows. YW is supported by the Fyssen Fondation and MRC Studentships. PD is supported by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation. JEG has received grants from the National Institute of Drug Abuse and the National Center for Responsible Gaming. TWR and BJS are supported on a WT Programme Grant (089589/Z/09/Z). The BCNI is supported by a WT and MRC grant.This is the final published version. It's also available from Molecular Psychiatry at http://www.nature.com/mp/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/mp201444a.html

Dopamine restores reward prediction errors in old age.

Senescence affects the ability to utilize information about the likelihood of rewards for optimal decision-making. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in humans, we found that healthy older adults had an abnormal signature of expected value, resulting in an incomplete reward prediction error (RPE) signal in the nucleus accumbens, a brain region that receives rich input projections from substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA) dopaminergic neurons. Structural connectivity between SN/VTA and striatum, measured by diffusion tensor imaging, was tightly coupled to inter-individual differences in the expression of this expected reward value signal. The dopamine precursor levodopa (L-DOPA) increased the task-based learning rate and task performance in some older adults to the level of young adults. This drug effect was linked to restoration of a canonical neural RPE. Our results identify a neurochemical signature underlying abnormal reward processing in older adults and indicate that this can be modulated by L-DOPA

Valence-dependent influence of serotonin depletion on model-based choice strategy.

Human decision-making arises from both reflective and reflexive mechanisms, which underpin goal-directed and habitual behavioural control. Computationally, these two systems of behavioural control have been described by different learning algorithms, model-based and model-free learning, respectively. Here, we investigated the effect of diminished serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine) neurotransmission using dietary tryptophan depletion (TD) in healthy volunteers on the performance of a two-stage decision-making task, which allows discrimination between model-free and model-based behavioural strategies. A novel version of the task was used, which not only examined choice balance for monetary reward but also for punishment (monetary loss). TD impaired goal-directed (model-based) behaviour in the reward condition, but promoted it under punishment. This effect on appetitive and aversive goal-directed behaviour is likely mediated by alteration of the average reward representation produced by TD, which is consistent with previous studies. Overall, the major implication of this study is that serotonin differentially affects goal-directed learning as a function of affective valence. These findings are relevant for a further understanding of psychiatric disorders associated with breakdown of goal-directed behavioural control such as obsessive-compulsive disorders or addictions.This research was funded by Wellcome Trust Grants awarded to VV (Intermediate WT Fellowship) and Programme Grant (089589/Z/09/Z) awarded to TWR, BJE, ACR, JWD and BJS. It was conducted at the Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, which is supported by a joint award from the Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust (G00001354). YW was supported by the Fyssen Foundation. SP is supported by Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship (FP7-People-2012-IEF).This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from NPG via http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/mp.2015.4